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RITUALS OR GOOD WORKS: SOCIAL
SIGNALLING IN RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
Gilat Levy
London School of Economics
Ronny Razin
London School of Economics
Abstract
We develop a model of social signalling of religiosity and cooperative behaviour in religious
organizations. The model embeds a ritual-based religious organization in which signalling arises
through the use of costly rituals, and a discipline-based religious organization in which such
signalling occurs through the monitoring of past behaviour. We use this framework to contrast -
positively and normatively- these two forms of social signalling. We show that ritual-based religions,
while using a costly and wasteful signal, also imply a higher level of coordination of behaviour
in social interactions and a higher incidence of mutual cooperation. Our welfare analysis suggests
that communities are more likely to support a switch to a discipline-based religion if strategic
complementarities are high, and if there is sufciently high level of public information about social
behaviour. This accords with the success of Calvin’s Reformation in Switzerland and France, a
process characterized by the reduction of rituals along with the creation of institutions to monitor
and publicise individuals’ behaviour, such as the Consistory. (JEL: D02 D71)
1. Introduction
Religious beliefs typically place high value on pro-social behaviour through different
theological systems.1 Beliefs in rewards and punishments, whether in this life or
the afterlife, are rife in many ancient and modern religions, and create an incentive
to properly behave in a social context. Even Calvinistic beliefs which emphasise
predestination, as Weber (1904) rst recognized, may constitute an incentive for good
works; this arises because an individual wishes to glean information about whether she
will be salvaged and doing good deeds provides a positive signal about the individual’s
future.2
The editor in charge of this paper was Dirk Bergemann.
Acknowledgments: We thank the editor and three anonymous referees for their comments. We also thank
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nancial support (grant no 210385).
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1. This is the motivation behind several studies investigating the relation between religiosity and
economic performance, such as Barro and McCleary (2003), Huber (2004) and Glaeser and Glenson
(1998).
2. On this Weber (1904) writes: "The question: Am I one of the elect? must sooner or later have arisen
for every believer".
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By enabling good behaviour, religious beliefs and religious organizationsmay also
induce individuals to signal their ethics and religiosity to others. Adam Smith observes
that religions tend to produce and distribute moral information about their members
which allows traders to assess the risk involved in conducting business with them.3
Weber (1906) writes of the social pressure in American Protestant communities,
Unqualied integrity, evidenced by, for example, a system of xed prices in retail
trade…appears as the specic, indeed, really the only, form by which one can
demonstrate his qualication as a Christian and therewith his moral legitimation for
membership in the sect…admittance into the Baptist congregation was primarily of
decisive importance…because of the on-going inquiries about moral and business conduct.
In this paper we compare two different mechanisms by which religious organisations
may enable social signalling of religiosity and ethical behaviour.
A recent literature has focused on costly rituals as signals of religiosity. While
religious rituals may perform several roles, their costly and public nature renders
them suitable for signals of religious conviction. Iannaccone (1992, 1998) and Berman
(2000) show how rituals allow religious groups to screen those who are less devout,
and Levy and Razin (2012) show how costly and public rituals allow individuals to
signal religiosity and hence good behaviour in social interactions.4 While the above
mechanism might be present in religions with a strong ritualistic emphasis, other
religions may rely on observed behaviour instead, as the description by Weber (1906)
above indicates. This theory is explored in Glaeser and Glendon (1998) who show how
Protestant beliefs may lead individuals to signal their religiosity by taking actions that
contribute to the common good. Arrunada (2010) refers to this as the Protestant “social
ethic”.
Religions which orchestrate behaviour in the social sphere using these two different
systems of social signals might induce different distributions of social behaviour and
economic outcomes. A community that relies on signalling by good behaviour might
reap more benets compared with one that uses a costly or a wasteful ritual. On the
other hand, a costly ritual may do a better job at screening out individuals with low
moral standards. Our aim in this paper is to compare these twomechanisms by focusing
on their behavioural and normative implications.
This comparison is especially pertinent in the context of the Reformation of the
Catholic church in the 16th century, and specically that of Calvin in Geneva. In
medieval times, the Catholic church had evolved to have an elaborate system of rent
extraction and a heavy load of rituals.5 In contrast, the reformers signicantly reduced
the number of rituals or religious sacraments an individual had to attend.6 In fact, Barro
3. See Anderson (1988).
4. See also Chwe (2003).
5. See Ekelund et al (1996, 2002).
6. Calvin had rejected the seven sacraments of the Catholic church and accepted only two sacraments as
valid (Baptism and the Lord’s Supper).
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and McCleary (2003) show that to this day Catholics participate in more church rituals
than Protestants.
Moreover, Calvin’s Reformation in Geneva has shifted the church’s emphasis
to discipline. In his second spell in the city, Calvin initiated the institution of the
Consistory to monitor, discipline and publicise individuals’ behaviour.7 A great deal
of its function was devoted to resolving civil disputes within families, between
neighbours, and between business associates. Deviant behaviour was punished
by public scolding, sometimes by Calvin himself. When other communities in
Switzerland and France decided to adopt Calvin’s religion, he insisted on the formation
of local Consistories, which are better suited to monitor local behaviour. In fact,
Arrunada (2010) shows that to this day, Protestants better monitor each other’s conduct
compared with Catholics.8 Calvin’s emphasis on discipline -religious and civil alike-
is evident in his insistence that discipline is the third mark of a good Church (this was
objected to by Lutherans) and is certainly a mark of his own reign in Geneva.9 While
fear of punishment itself may trigger discipline and good behaviour, punishments for
deviant behaviour often consisted of either public scolding or of being denied access
to communion; the key element of the punishment was therefore its public nature (we
provide a more detailed discussion of the Consistory and these issues in Section 5.1).
Finally, our welfare comparison is motivated by the explicit choice faced by
city-states in Switzerland between the highly ritualistic Catholic church and Calvin’s
Reformation. In such autonomous city-states, the choice of which religion to adopt
was often decided by a vote in the city council. There are many political and economic
factors behind the decision to adopt the Reformation, and our welfare analysis
highlights a new dimension along which the two religions may be compared.10
We analyse a simple model which allows us to consider both types of social
signalling. The model is based on the premise that religions moderate cooperative
behaviour and thus possibly induce enhanced material utility, through a spiritual
dimension and a signalling method.11 We assume that a population of individuals
is randomly matched into pairs to play a Prisoners’ Dilemma (with strategic
complementarities).12 Religious beliefs, heterogeneous and privately known, consist
of a perceived spiritual benet from cooperative behaviour.
7. An institution of the same name existed before but dealt mainly with marriage law.
8. McCleary (2007) also shows that Protestants tend to trust or place obligations on others as they do
with family members.
9. We discuss the differences between Calvin’s Reformation and that of Luther in Section 6.2.
10. Political factors such as the declined inuence of the Roman church, or economic factors relating to
urbanisation and the abuses of church power, are among the explanations for the Reformation. See Flick
(1930).
11. Wilson (2002) provides examples of the secular utility in the form of social order that religious
institutions provide, from early Christianity offering a mini-welfare state in the Roman Empire (see also
Stark 1996), through regulation of rice production in Indonesia, to modern US churches providing a social
network to its members.
12. Numerous papers have analysed social norms when social interaction is modelled by a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. Greif (1989) studies how cooperation arises due to repeated interactions. A recent literature
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In a ritual-based religion, individuals can participate in costly and public rituals,
and can condition their behaviour in the Prisoners’ Dilemma game on whether their
opponent participates as well. In a discipline-based religion, individuals’ behaviour
in an initial round of play is publicly observed. Individuals can then condition their
subsequent behaviour on whether their opponents have behaved well in the past. The
model allows for a spiritual as well as a material benet from cooperative behaviour.
A spiritual benet arises in both religions due to religious beliefs. A material benet
arises due to successful social signalling which elicits more cooperation from others.
In the ritual-based religion, the cost of the signal determines the level of
participation in rituals. We show that the Pareto dominant level of rituals induces an
accurate signal, that is, all those who participate in rituals also cooperate with one
another. In the discipline-based religion, the cost of signalling -i.e., the loss from
cooperation- is endogenous, and depends on the share of those that cooperate in the rst
period. We show that this induces a noisy signal in equilibrium, in which a relatively
large share of individuals cooperate in the rst period. These large initial cooperation
levels accord with Weber’s (1906) observations of the “probation” period for new
members in the North American sects that descended from the Calvinistic theology.13
We highlight a trade-off between the accuracy of the signal and its cost. The
ritual-based religion allows for a costly but an accurate signal. The discipline-based
religion on the other hand induces excessive signalling, i.e., some agents who initially
cooperate, defect later on to take advantage of others. This leads individuals to be more
suspicious and less cooperative in the second period. We show that the implication of
this is that the ritual-based religion can achieve higher levels of mutual cooperation as
well as higher total coordination in behaviour.
We then consider averagematerial welfare and identify two environments in which
the above trade-off is resolved in favour of the discipline-based religion. We show
that if strategic complementarities are sufciently large, then both religions induce
sufciently similar and high levels of mutual cooperation, but the ritual-based religion
is strictly costly and is thus dominated. The discipline-based religion also dominates if
cooperation is more benecial than coordination (so that even one-sided cooperation
yields sufciently large gains to society compared with mutual defection). In this case
the accuracy and informativeness provided by the ritual-based religion is not valued
enough, and moreover, the ritual cost must be high as individuals are keen to avoid
mutual defection. If on the other hand coordination is sufciently important, the ritual-
based religion can dominate.
When we consider individual preferences, material and spiritual, we show that it
is individuals with relatively weak beliefs that support a switch to a discipline-based
religion. These are the individuals who enjoy the positive externalities that signalling
has analysed cooperation when players sustain different norms; see for example Dixit (2003), Tabellini
(2008), and Andreoni and Samuelson (2006).
13. Weber (1906) writes: “And the Canonical limitation of the size of the unity, the congregation, to such
dimensions that all members personally know one another and, therefore, can judge and supervise their
"probation" reciprocally has always been a fundamental Baptist principle.”
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by behaviour entails. Furthermore, if some individuals prefer to maintain the ritual-
based religion, they must include individuals of intermediate beliefs. Such individuals
value the accuracy of the signal provided by the ritual-based religion which allows
them to change their behaviour in response to others’ signalling. We also show that
the support for a discipline-based religion increases with the availability of public
information. This result is consistent with the experience of Calvin’s Reformation in
Geneva (see Section 5.1).
Our analysis brings to the fore a way to distinguish religious organizations
according to the type of social signalling they generate. To be sure, both types of
signalling mechanisms that we analyse may be used in any religion. However, we
argue that in terms of its focus, Calvin’s reformation can be seen as a shift of emphasis
from rituals to discipline. In this sense our work is in the spirit of Botticini and
Eckstein (2005, 2007) who consider the transformation of Judaism from a religion
based on sacrices in the Temple to a religion whose core is the reading of the Torah in
synagogues, and Carvalho and Koyama (2011) who consider how religious restrictions
change in response to growth. Complementary to our analysis is Glaeser and Glendon
(1998) who compare the free will theology to the Weber’s (1904) “Protestant work
ethic” that induces individuals to focus on entrepreneurial actions that are more
visible.14 In contrast, we let both religions induce the same actions, and concentrate
instead on the different social signalling methods and hence, in this sense, we follow
Weber (1906) instead.
Our second contribution is to provide a framework for the positive and normative
analysis of these two signalling mechanisms. This framework is based on the ritual-
based religion we have analysed in Levy and Razin (2012); in that paper we have
analysed a more general model of the ritual-based religion, with a greater focus on
religious beliefs, including a dynamic version which allows for belief updating. The
current paper simplies that model to embed an alternative signalling method in order
to compare between the two. Given our discussion of the Reformation, religious
organizations are a natural application to evaluate differences in signalling methods,
but our model and results can be interpreted more generally; for example, the literature
on signalling wealth or status has also considered different signalling mechanisms,
either by conspicuous consumption or by a productive activity such as charity giving.15
Finally, our results can shed some light on recent empirical papers that have looked
at the economic implications of the Catholic and the Protestant religions. Barro and
McCleary (2003) show that economic growth responds positively to the extent of
religious beliefs, notably those in hell and heaven, but negatively to church attendance.
Our model shows that beliefs are indeed conducive for good economic outcomes
and that costly and wasteful rituals are the main determinant behind the sometimes
inferiority of the ritual-based religion. Guiso et al. (2003, 2006) show that religious
14. Kantas and Stefanadix (2010) focus instead on the comparison between pride-based moral code (such
as Protestantism) and guilt-based moral code (such as Catholicism) and show that the former leads to amore
favourable attitude towards work.
15. For examples see Konrad and Glazer (1996) and Pesendorfer (1995).
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beliefs are associated with more trust and better economic attitudes and that these
effects are larger for Protestants than for Catholics.16 Becker and Woessmann (2009)
suggest that literacy levels can explain the better economic outcomes of Protestant
(mainly Lutheran) societies; literacy may be correlated with a higher level of public
dissemination of information. Cantoni (2010) however nds that overall, the growth
of Lutheran and Catholic cities is roughly the same.
We present the model of the two religions in Section 2. We analyse the equilibria
in Section 3. Comparative -positive and normative- analysis is presented in Section 4.
In Section 5 we discuss the Consistory in more detail and consider some supply side
extensions. We discuss the potential link between theology and institutions and the
comparison between Calvin and Luther in Section 6. All proofs are in the appendix.
2. A Model of Religious Organizations
We present a model which embeds two religious organisations. Our aim is to make the
two specications as close as possible to one another so as to focus the comparison
on the different signalling structures. We rst present their common elements: the
economic environment, religious beliefs and pay-offs.
2.1. Economic Environment and Religious Beliefs
The Social Interaction. There are two periods of interaction; in each period,
individuals are randomly paired to play a Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game,
C D
C d;d 0; b
D b; 0 a; a
where a; b and d are bounded parameters, satisfying b > d > a > 0. We assume
strategic complementarities in cooperation, i.e., that b   d < a. This assumption
implies that the relative loss from cooperation is smaller when the opponent cooperates.
The assumption of strategic complementarities is often made in the literature that
focuses on how cooperation stems from preferences or moral obligations.17 Also,
recent empirical evidence shows that religious afliation affects levels of trust in
society, which is potentially captured in the PD environment; but the model can easily
be extended to other types of public good games in which the interaction is not
necessarily pairwise and in which strategic complementarities typically play a role.18
16. La Porta et al. (1997) show that countries with hierarchical religions perform comparatively worse
on a wide range of outcomes, which accords with Putnam (1993) who suggests that such religions deter
formation of trust.
17. See for example Tabellini (2008) and references therein.
18. One can easily analyse the model under the alternative assumption of strategic substitutes; the model
would then identify a need to signal one’s willingness to defect, and in equilibrium, religious individuals
Journal of the European Economic Association
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We denote with  the level of strategic complementarities,   a=.b   d/ > 1.
Note that  > 1 also implies that 2d > b, so that mutual cooperation is the efcient
outcome. For our welfare analysis, we distinguish between the case in which b > 2a,
i.e., when one-sided cooperation is more socially efcient than coordination, and the
case of 2a > b, in which coordination of actions among agents is more important than
cooperation.
Religious Beliefs. To facilitate our analysis, we assume that in both religions, the
theology instills beliefs that have similar effects on behaviour: We assume that each
individual i believes that if he cooperates he is rewarded with a spiritual benet
i  0.
19
Such beliefs can be interpreted under both the free will and predestination doctrines
in Christian Theology.Under the free will theology of the Catholic Church, good deeds
affect salvation. Different i types may therefore have a different perception of the
benets from salvation or alternatively the probability that private actions will affect
salvation. A richer model of Catholic Theology might allow for such rewards to be
conditioned not only on good works but also on church obedience and participation in
rituals; we discuss this in Section 6.1.
In contrast, the theology of predestination implies that salvation is independent of
the individual’s good works. For Calvin, it is by God’s grace that an individual will be
salvaged. But asWeber (1904) suggested, goodworks can become amean to self signal
one’s membership in the elect. A self-signalling mechanism can induce individuals to
cooperate (motivated by the behavioural prescriptions put forward through the stories
on Christ in the scriptures) in order to assure themselves that they belong to the elect.
In a companion working paper, Levy and Razin (2011), we derive such a model which
provides a self-signalling interpretation for the reduced-form beliefs/types i .
20
Pay-offs and the Distribution over Types. In any period of play, the utility of an
individual will be the sum of the material and the spiritual utility. For example, the
relative payoff of cooperation vs. defection is xC i , where x 2 ¹d   b; aº depends
on opponents’ actions. It would be more interesting to concentrate on the strategic
interaction of agents with types i  a (as otherwise an agent would have a strictly
dominant strategy to cooperate). We then assume that with probability 1    < 1, an
individual’s type is drawn uniformly from Œ0; a. An individual with weak convictions,
would defect against each other. This goes against the empirical and experimental ndings in the literature
(see Sosis and Rufe 2004 and Iannaccone 1998).
19. The heterogeneity of types accords with evolutionary biology theories of the “religious mind”. See
Boyer (2002).
20. A recent literature has other, related, models of religious beliefs. Benabou and Tirole (2006, 2011)
assume that agents differ in their beliefs with respect to how much hard work is rewarded, in this or in the
afterlife, and actively choose to maintain such beliefs. In Scheve and Stasavage (2006) on the other hand,
religious beliefs allow for a psychic benet in bad times. Alaoui and Sandroni (2013) show an equivalence
result between the utility functions of secular agents who have a moral obligation to accumulate wealth
and those of religious agents who believe in Calvin’s version of predestination.
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or “non-believer”, would have i < b   d and thus a strictly dominant action to defect
(although the possibility of signalling might change his behaviour). An individual with
a conviction i 2 Œb   d; a, or a “believer”, prefers to cooperate if his opponent
cooperates for sure. More generally, his best response is to cooperate if the likelihood
of facing cooperation is high enough whereas this likelihood decreases with i . With
the remaining probability  > 0, the individual is a behavioural type who always
cooperates. Similarly to the reputation literature, we assume that the fraction of
behavioural types  is relatively small compared to the believers so that  < N and
a > a for some N; a > 0.21
A Benchmark. Prior to introducing the possibility of signalling, we analyse the
“autarky” benchmark of the two PD games, where no signalling arises. In other words,
when individuals cannot condition their behaviour on any information.
Lemma 1. In the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, there exists O 2 .b   d; a/ such
that all individuals i with i < O defect and all those with i > O cooperate in both
periods of the PD games, where O 0./ < 0, lim!0 O ! a and O solves,
a   O C a 
1 
aC a 
1 
.d   b/C
O
aC a 
1 
. a/C O D 0
When no signalling arises, individuals either cooperate or defect disregarding how
others behave. As there is a share of behavioural types who always cooperate, some
typewith high enough reward from cooperationwill cooperate as well, and in particular
the type at the cutoff O is indifferent between cooperating and defecting when all types
above him are cooperating and all types below him are defecting. Note however that
when  is small and specically when  ! 0, then O ! a and no meaningful levels of
cooperation can be sustained.
2.2. Signalling: Rituals or Discipline
Our model identies a need for social signalling to increase coordination on
cooperative outcomes. We now describe two signalling methods. One signalling
method allows for information about behaviour in the PD game to be transmitted across
the periods of play. Another signalling technology allows only for information about
auxiliary activities -such as rituals- to be available for players in the PD game.
Signalling by Discipline. In this specication we assume that in the second period,
players have information on the rst-period behaviour of their opponents. Players can
use this information to make inferences about their opponents’ religious types. We
term a religion that has this (and only this) signalling technology a discipline-based
21. N is derived from the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2.
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religion (D). For now we assume that players are fully informed about the rst period
behaviour of opponents and in Section 5.1 we consider lower levels of information.
Signalling by Public Rituals. In this specication we assume that individuals can
participate in a ritual which is costly and observable. The cost of the ritual is denoted
by r  0. Players can then use the information on their opponents’ choice of ritual
participation to make inferences on their religious type. We term a religion that has
this (and only this) signalling technology a ritual-based religion (R). To keep it simple,
we assume that ritual participation can occur only once, prior to playing the two
PD games.22 For now we treat r as an exogeneous variable (we discuss supply side
considerations in Section 5.2).
To recapitulate, the timing of the game is therefore as follows:
Period 0. In the R religion, individuals choose whether to pay r .
Period 1. Individuals are randomly matched with an opponent to play the PD game.
In the R religion, before taking an action, they observe whether the opponent paid r .
Period 2. Individuals are randomly matched with a new opponent to play the PD
game. Before taking their action, in the R religion they observe whether the opponent
had paid r , in the D religion they observe the opponent’s Period 1 behaviour.
We assume no discounting; the payoff of an individual from the R religion is
therefore her payoff from the PD games (material and spiritual), minus the cost of
rituals if she chooses to participate, whereas the payoff of an individual in the D religion
is her payoff in the two PD games.23
Remark 1 (The Taxonomy of Religious Organizations). For modelling purposes we
have focused on two social signalling technologies: one by ritualistic participation
and the other by discipline. Obviously this is a simplication as most religions or
other social organizations will make use of both these technologies. Religious leaders
in a ritual-based religion might also make use of institutions such as the Consistory
and discipline-based religions might also have some ritualistic prescriptions. Still,
organizations will differ in the focus they place on each signalling technology (as in
the case of the Catholic and Protestant churches in the 16th century), and the analysis
of each technology separately can shed light on such institutions.
22. Allowing for just a single choice of ritual participation simplies matters technically but note that the
results will be qualitatively similar if individuals can pay r before any period of the PD game, as the value
of r will adjust to reect the value of signalling.
23. The choice of two interaction periods of the PD game is not an important assumption; it is the smallest
number of periods that allows for signalling in the D religion, and for the sake of comparison we have the
same number of interaction periods in each religion. As long as the information about past behaviour in
the D religion is just about Period 1, all of our results could be easily extended to n periods of interaction.
If this “probation period” is extended, the analysis becomes more complicated but qualitatively the results
will have a similar nature.
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Note that the two religions we analyze in the text can be constructed as extreme
cases of a unied model, in which individuals can both pay r and observe rst-period
information. At one extreme, information on rst-period behaviour is not available,
and individuals can only use r to signal, which will mimick the R religion. At the other
extreme, the value of r does not allow for meaningful signalling but information about
rst-period behaviour is available, which will mimick the D religion. In Section 5.3
and in Appendix B we analyse hybrid religions which involve both types of signalling
technologies. We show that when both signals are used meaningfully, the gist of our
results is maintained. We also discuss supply side considerations that might induce
some religious leaders to choose one signalling institution rather than the other, and
relate the choice of signalling methods to potential geographical and technological
constraints, and to the different theologies.
Equilibria. We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in each religion. It is in general
true that when endogenous population signalling games are considered, the benet
from signalling is not necessarily monotone in one’s type, yielding equilibria with
no generally dened characteristics or with perverse forms of signalling.24 In Levy
and Razin (2012) we introduce a “belief activation” assumption which renes the set
of social signalling equilibria to only monotone equilibria with potentially positive
benets from signalling behaviour. Such monotone equilibria imply that an individual
who does not signal, i.e., does not participate in rituals in the R religion or defects
in the rst period in the D religion, will defect in all remaining PD games. For the
sake of simplifying the model we will henceforth restrict attention to such monotone
equilibria. We provide the details of the renement in Appendix C.
3. Social Signalling in the Two Religions
We start by describing the general features of equilibria in both models. We say that
an agent does not signal if he does not pay r in the R religion, or defects in Period 1 in
the D religion. In a monotone equilibrium, every agent who does not signal, indicates
a clear intention to defect in the (remaining) PD games. This leaves us with only two
types of equilibria, differing in terms of the intentions to cooperate of those who do
signal.
In an equilibrium with accurate signalling, all agents who signal also cooperate.
That is, in R, all agents who pay r also cooperate in the PD games in periods 1 and 2,
and in D, all those who cooperate in period 1, also cooperate in period 2.
An equilibrium with excessive signalling implies that signalling is noisy, so that
some agents who signal actually defect. In this case, non-believers also engage in
signalling, in order to take advantage of their good reputation and defect while gaining
24. For population games with signalling see Kranton (1996) or Athey et al (2010).
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cooperation fromothers. This is summarised in the Lemma below (note that the Lemma
species which equilibria might potentially exist, but does not establish existence yet):
Lemma 2. In both religions, there are only two possible types of monotone equilibria:
(i) An equilibrium with accurate signalling, characterized by some cutoff  2
Œb   d; a/ such that: In the R religion, all agents above  participate in rituals, all
below  defect with all, and all in Œ; a cooperate with those who had participated
in rituals and defect against those who had not. Similarly, in the D religion, all agents
above  cooperate in Period 1, and in Period 2 all below  defect with all, and all in
Œ; a cooperate with those who had cooperated in Period 1 and defect against those
who had not.
(ii) An equilibrium with excessive signalling, characterized by two cutoffs,
1 < b   d and 2 2 .b   d; a/ such that: In the R religion all above 1 participate
in rituals, all below 2 defect against all, and all those in .2; a/ cooperate with those
who had participated in rituals and defect against those who did not participate in
rituals. Similarly in the D religion, all above 1 cooperate in Period 1, and in Period 2
all below 2 defect against all, and all those in .2; a/ cooperate with those who had
cooperated in Period 1 and defect against those who did not. In both religions, given
1, 2 is the unique solution to
.a   2/C a

1 
.a   1/C a

1 
.d   b/C
.2   1/
.a   1/C a

1 
. a/C 2 D 0: (1)
In the equilibria above, a spiritual as well as a material benet arises for social
signalling. A spiritual benet arises as individualswho signal (pay r in R and cooperate
in Period 1 in D) also tend to cooperate which provides them with a spiritual benet.
A material benet arises as agents in Œ; a in the accurate signal equilibrium, or in
Œ2; a in the excessive signalling equilibrium, change their behaviour favourably in
response to an observation of an opponent who had signalled good intentions.
To see how the material benet is determined in the excessive signalling
equilibrium, note that, as in the autarky case, the cutoff type at 2 is indifferent
between cooperating and defecting, and hence is determined according to the xed
point equation (1). In this equation, .a   2 C a=.1  //=.a   1 C a=.1  // is
the share of those who had signalled and will cooperate against those who had done so
as well, and .2   1/=.a  1C a=.1  // is the remaining share of those who had
signalled but will defect. A unique solution arises with 2 < a so a material benet
exists. Note that 2 is decreasing in 1, i.e., when signalling becomes more excessive,
agents are more suspicious and less willing to cooperate later on (specically, when
1 D 0, then 2 D O identied in Lemma 1). Finally, the cutoffs 1 and 
 will be
determined according to the specic signalling method, which we analyse next.
3.1. Social Signalling in the Discipline-Based Religion
The next lemma characterizes the equilibria in the D religion.
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Lemma 3. In the D religion there exists a unique equilibrium which is characterized
by excessive signalling
In the D religion the cost of signalling is endogenous and is determined by the
measure of agents who cooperate in period 1. This, as we show in the appendix,
implies that signalling must be excessive; all types above b   d would rather pay the
cost of cooperating, given the spiritual benet they gain from cooperation and future
cooperation with the types above them.
To determine 1, the type who is indifferent between cooperating and defecting in
the rst period, note that the following xed point equation has to be satised:
. C .1  /.a 1
a
//.d   b/C .1  /1
a
. a/C 1„ ƒ‚ …
Period 1 Difference in Expected Payoff
C .1  /.a 2
a
/.b   a/„ ƒ‚ …
Period 2 Difference in Expected Payoff
D 0
(2)
The second period difference in expected payoff between cooperating and
defecting is composed of the benet from changing the behaviour of other agents to
be cooperative, while planning to defect. The rst period difference is the endogenous
cost of signalling by cooperation conditional on all above 1 cooperating. It is easy to
show that given (1), 1 has a unique solution in Œ0; b   d/.
Endogenous signalling pins down a unique excessive signalling equilibrium with
period 1’s discipline effect of good behaviour, which induces even those below b   d
to cooperate. But this createsmuch lower cooperation levels in period 2 as believers are
aware that some agents will defect and are thus less willing to cooperate themselves.
The next example shows that this might imply that the average level of cooperation
across the two periods is relatively low. In Proposition 1 below we will generalize this
result.
Example 1. Assume that the PD pay-offs are given by,
C D
C 3; 3 0; 4
D 4; 0 2; 2
In the limit, when  ! 0, the equilibrium conditions (1) and (2) imply that 1 is
close to 1 and 2 ' 1:5. The distribution over outcomes is reported in the tables below.
For example, in the rst period, mutual cooperation arises when a type above 1 meets
another type above 1. The share of suchmeetings in the population is .1  .1=a//
2'
0:25. Note that potentially, all believers (above b   d D 1/ might cooperate (i.e., in
25%of the matches). This is indeed the case in Period 1, but cooperation is substantially
lower in period 2,
period 1 C D
C 25% 25%
D 25% 25%
period 2 C D
C 6% 6%
D 6% 72%
average C D
C 15% 15%
D 15% 55%

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3.2. Social Signalling in the Ritual-Based Religion
In the ritual-based religion, the cost of signalling is exogeneous and is determined by
r .25 The following Lemma characterizes the equilibria in the R religion:
Lemma 4. In the R religion, both excessive and accurate signalling exist. Moreover,
for any  2 Œ0; a/, there exists a ritual cost r so that all types above will participate
in rituals.
If  > b   d , the equilibrium will be an accurate one, and otherwise it will be
excessive. For equilibria with excessive signalling, the type at the cutoff 1 plans
to defect against all. Paying r grants him the additional cooperation of all types in
Œ2; a W
26
r D 2.1  /
a   2
a

.b   a/
For any 1 2 Œ0; b   d, 2 is as determined in (1), and we can then nd the r
that will support this equilibrium. Note that higher levels of rituals must give rise to a
lower 2 and as a result a higher 1, and thus serve to improve the informativeness of
the signal.
Consider now the accurate equilibrium, where for any cutoff   b   d , the
relevant cost will satisfy:
r D 2.d   b C /C 2.1  /

a   
a

.d   aC /
The cost makes the cutoff type  indifferent between paying r or not. Paying r has
two effects on an agent’s behaviour in the two periods of play. First, he cooperates
against all behavioural types instead of defecting, which provides a relative reward
of d   b C . Second, all types in Œ; a become cooperative, and he cooperates
with them, which provides a relative reward of d   a C . Clearly for any cutoff
 2 Œb   d; a/ we can nd a cost level r which will support such an equilibrium.
Example 1 Revisited. Consider again Example 1 and the accurate equilibrium with
the largest participation, i.e., when  D b   d D 1. In the limit, when  ! 0, r ' 2,
and the distribution of play is reported below. Note that all the potential for mutual
cooperation is realized,
R C D
C 25% 0%
D 0% 75%
25. For concreteness we assume that behavioural types, who always cooperate, also participate in rituals.
This would also be the case if these types were rational. As the measure of behavioural types is small this
assumption is without consequence to our results but simplies the exposition.
26. Note that the equilibrium is equivalent to an equilibrium in which a share .2   1/=a of agents
below 2 participate in rituals but defect, as in equilibrium all agents below 2 are indifferent between
paying r or not. For concreteness we describe this equilibrium as one with a cutoff.
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As the level of r is exogeneous, for all parameters, a continuum of equilibria
exist in the ritual-based religion. To facilitate our comparisonwith the discipline-based
religion, we focus on one particular equilibrium, the accurate signalling equilibrium
with the largest participation as described in Example 1 above. This equilibrium is in
the closure of both the accurate and the excessive signalling sets. We can also show:
Lemma 5. The accurate equilibrium in which  D b   d and r D 2.1  /.1  
.b   d/=a//.b   a/ is the unique Pareto dominant equilibrium whenever there exists
some strictly positive measure of agents who do not participate in rituals.27
To see why this equilibrium is Pareto dominant, consider for example the set of
all excessive signalling equilibria. In these equilibria, the price is determined by the
marginal type who is indifferent between paying r or not conditional on defecting, but
for those who do participate, the gain from participation in rituals is conditional upon
cooperating, which by strategic complementarities is higher. It is therefore worthwhile
for them to pay a higher price for a less noisy signal and higher cooperation. On
the other hand, those who never participate in rituals or never cooperate have the
same utility across all equilibria (namely the utility of being identied and gaining
cooperation only from behavioural types).
The equilibrium above allows us to identify the trade-off between accuracy and
cost; some of our results below extend to all values of r and the others will be robust
to small deviations from r. Moreover, Pareto dominance may imply that religious
leaders facing competition might wish to choose this level of rituals, and as we show
in Section 5.2, in some environments, this equilibrium also maximises the revenue that
can be extracted from agents from religious organization. Henceforth, in the R religion,
we focus on the equilibrium described in Lemma 5.
4. Good Works or Rituals?
The above two organizations offer two different channels for individuals to publicly
signal their religious convictions and their future behaviour. In this section we compare
the equilibria of the two organizations in terms of the different distributions of
behaviour they induce, and in terms of their normative implications.
We start by considering the positive implications of the two religions, where
we compare behaviour in the two periods of the PD game in each religion. Next,
we consider average material welfare, which also takes into consideration the cost
of rituals. Average material welfare may be a relevant welfare criterion when one
27. In the limit when  ! 0, indeed in all equilibria there is some strictly positive measure of individuals
who do not participate in rituals.
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considers the long term survival of religious organizations.28 There is also a substantial
empirical literature looking at economic outcomes across countries with different
religions and an analysis of average material welfare can possibly shed light on
these different outcomes.29 Finally, we look at individual preferences, which include
both material and spiritual pay-offs. This normative analysis is more relevant when
considering the political economy of religious reforms in communities. Indeed,
the decision to switch alliances and adopt Calvin’s Reformation in city states in
Switzerland and communities in France was often taken by a vote in one or more City
Councils. Calvin’s eventual success to convince the Genevan council to tie the city to
the Reformed Church hinged on the council members’ approval.30
4.1. The Distribution of Behaviour
As the signal in the ritual-based religion is fully accurate, it leads to full coordination
among players (abstracting from the behavioural types). When believers meet each
other, they have both signalled and will thus cooperate with each other. In all other
matches, which involve at least one non-believerwho had not signalled, the playerswill
coordinate on mutual defection. In contrast, in the discipline-based religion, signalling
is excessive implying that some miscoordination will arise. In the next Proposition
we show that the R religion leads to both higher coordination and higher mutual
cooperation:
Proposition 1. There is a higher level of mutual cooperation and a higher level
of total coordination (mutual cooperation and mutual defection) in the ritual-based
religion.
The proof of Proposition 1 shows that in D, the additional cooperation in period
1, the “discipline” period, is overshadowed by the reduced cooperation in period 2. To
see the intuition, consider the case when  ! 0 which results in 1 ! b   d: In that
case, signalling (in D) in period 1 via good behaviour is relatively accurate so only a
few agents below b   d cooperate. This small share, who plan to defect in period 2,
induces those types just above b   d to defect as well. But once more agents above
b   d are known to defect, others with slightly stronger beliefs will defect as well;
this effect snowballs and keeps 2 bounded away from b   d , resulting in lower levels
of overall mutual cooperation. The proof involves showing that this argument holds
uniformly in the PD parameters a; b and d:
We now turn to consider the implications of Proposition 1 for the welfare
comparison between the two religions.
28. The evolutionary game theory literature often considers the survival of different preference types-
measured by pure material pay-offs. Wilson (2002) advances the ideas of “group tness” vis a vis individual
tness.
29. See for example Barro and McCleary (2003), Guiso et al (2003, 2006) and Cantoni (2010).
30. See Wilson (2002).
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4.2. Average Material Welfare
The result above had indicated that the ritual-based religion provides not only accurate
signalling, but also more instances of the socially efcient outcome.We now show that
this does not necessarily translate into higher social welfare.
In the next Proposition we focus on environments in which both religions offer
similar behavioural prescriptions compared to the cost of rituals in the R religion,
which implies that the latter is dominated. Specically, when  -the level of strategic
complementarities, i.e., a=.b   d/- is large, there are relatively few non-believers
compared with the population of believers. Intuitively, this implies that both religions
easily generate mutual cooperation and so differences between the two in terms of
behaviour will be small. The cost of rituals on the other hand might be substantial.
This cost is given by
r D 2.1  /

1 
1


.b   a/
and depends on the share of the believers, which is large for a large  , and on .b   a/,
which is the value that non-believers place on taking advantage of believers. Thus,
when  is large and .b   a/ not too small, the D religion will dominate. This is
formalized in the following Proposition (which can be generalized to other values of
r).
Proposition 2. For any " > 0, there exists a  " > 0, such that for all  >  ", either
(i) the discipline-based religion induces a strictly higher average material welfare
compared with the ritual-based religion or (ii) the difference in average welfare
between the two religions is smaller than ".
We now analyse the case in which the difference in behaviour is not marginal,
and the trade-off between the religions in terms of accuracy versus cost is more
strongly manifested. We show that what matters for the resolution of this trade-off
is the importance of coordination vis a vis cooperation. To see this, let us revisit rst
Example 1.
Example 1 revisited. Recall the PD, with b D 4, d D 3 and a D 2. Note that 2a D b.
R has more instances of mutual cooperation, so that 10% of the outcomes result in an
average payoff of 3 instead of 2, a gain of 1 on 10%of outcomes per period. On the
other hand, all agents above 1% – 50% of the population- pay a cost of 2. Thus the
relative cost of R is larger than its benet, resulting in this religion being dominated.
When 2a is not sufciently large compared with b, as in Example 1, two effects
arise. First, coordination -which is what R is good at achieving- is not valued enough
compared with miscoordination (an outcome that the D religion produces with a high
probability). Second, the cost of ritual is quite high in equilibrium: As the benet from
mutual defection is too low, believers would agree to pay a high cost in order to change
the behaviour of others towards them. Thus, accuracy is not valued enough and the cost
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is too high, which implies that the trade-off between accuracy and cost is resolved in
favour of the D religion. We therefore have,
Proposition 3. If coordination is not sufficiently important compared with
cooperation (i.e., if 2a is not sufficiently large compared with b) then the discipline-
based religion provides higher average material welfare.
When on the other hand a is sufciently high, the ritual-based religion can
dominate:
Example 2. Consider the following PD game, in which, compared with Example 1,
we have increased the value of a (together with d which must satisfy d > a/:
C D
C 3:9; 3:9 0; 4
D 4; 0 3:7; 3:7
In R, in the limit when  ! 0,  ' 0:1 and r ' 0:58, which is paid by almost
the whole population, and the distribution of play is close to:
C D
C 94% 0%
D 0% 6%
Average welfare is 2.0:94.3:9/C 0:06.3:7//  .0:98/.0:58/D 7:2. In D, there is
a large degree of cooperation in period 1 as 1 ' 0:1. But as even the small degree
of non-believers defecting snowballs to substantially deter cooperation in period 2,
2 ' 2:5, so that only 10 percent of outcomes end in mutual cooperation:
period 1 C D
C 94% 3%
D 3% 0%
period 2 C D
C 10% 22%
D 22% 48%
average C D
C 52% 12%
D 12% 24%
Average welfare is 2.0:52.3:9/C 0:24.3:7/ C 0:24.2// ' 6:8 and thus D is
dominated; the cost of R is relatively low and in addition D creates a substantial level
of one-sided cooperation which is sufciently inferior, socially, compared to any other
outcome. 
4.3. Individual Preferences
We now consider individual preferences. We nd the following results. First, as
signalling by good behaviour has positive externalities to the rest of society, this
implies that non-believers prefer the discipline-based religion. Second, this analysis
takes into account not only material but also spiritual utilities; the latter induces
individuals to prefer the religion in which they cooperate more often. This, as long as
strategic complementarities are strong enough, will imply that intermediate believers
will support the ritual-based religion.
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Let UJ ./ denote the (indirect) utility of an individual  in the equilibrium in
religion J 2 ¹R;Dº and let RD./ D UR./   UD./ denote the difference in
utilities between the ritual-based religion and the discipline-based religion for a type
 .
Lemma 6. There exists  0 > 1 such that: (i) If    0 then RD./ decreases with
 .(ii) If  >  0, RD./ increases with  on Œb   d; 2 and decreases otherwise.
Note thatRD./ is composed of a material relative benet and a spiritual relative
benet. The material relative benet is xed for all types that behave in the same way
and elicit the same behaviour from others. On the other hand, the spiritual relative
benet is the difference in the probabilities with which one cooperates in the two
religions, multiplied by the benet from cooperation,  . It is therefore positive and
increasing in  over an interval in which agents cooperatemore often in R and negative
and decreasing in  otherwise.
When  is sufciently large (for example, when  ! 0; we need  >  0 ! 2/
so that the share of believers is large, types in Œb   d; 2 cooperate on average more
often in R; in R they cooperate vis a vis all believers (and thus with a relatively high
probability), whereas in D they cooperate with all in the rst period but with no one
in the second period. Thus, the higher the  in this region, the higher is the spiritual
relative benet from R. As the material relative benet is xed in this interval this
implies that RD./ increases.
In all other regions RD./ always decreases with  as all other types cooperate
more often (at least weakly) in D. For example, types in Œ0; b   d never cooperate in
R while some of them cooperate in D in the rst period due to the discipline effect.31
Using Lemma 6 we have:
Proposition 4. There exists  0 such that: (i) If    0, all individuals prefer the
discipline-based religion. (ii) If  >  0, there exists  0;  00 with b   d   0  2 
 00  a, so that only types in Œ 0;  00 prefer the ritual-based religion, and there exist
parameters for which  0 <  00.
Consider rst the types with weak beliefs, or non believers, who do not signal in
any religion. In R all types (besides the behavioural ones) identify them as they do not
participate in rituals. But in D many cooperate with them in the rst period due to the
discipline effect, which induces them to prefer D. This effect arises as D is based on a
signal which provides positive externalities to others (note that this result holds for all
r/.
If  is too low, then RD./ decreases for all  , which by the above implies that
all individuals support D. This is the case for the parameters of Example 1. When
31. Similarly, types in Œ2; a cooperate more in D: in D they cooperate with all in the rst period and
with all types above 1 < b   d in the second period. In R they cooperate with all above b   d .
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 is sufciently large, by Lemma 6, some individuals may prefer R. Moreover, the
type at 2 will be its strongest supporter. As he cooperates more in R, he will have
a higher spiritual payoff there. But also his material payoff might be higher, as the
accurate signal in R allows him to better protect himself against defectors compared
to the signal in D. This is the case for the parameters of Example 2:
Examples 1 and 2 Revisited. In Example 1,  D lim!0  0 D 2, which implies that
all individuals prefer D. In Example 2 on the other hand strategic complementarities
are very large, with  D 37. Computing individual utilities, we nd that all types above
Q ' 0:4 2 Œb   d; 2 prefer R, which constitutes 88%of the population.
One may wonder how individual preferences interact with average material
welfare. For example, based on their material and spiritual welfare and a simple
majority rule, would individuals choose environmentswhich also yield higher material
welfare for their community? In Examples 1 and 2 this was the case. Example 3
considers parameters (namely a and d ) which are between Examples 1 and 2 and
shows that this can fail.
Example 3. Consider the PD game with b D 4, d D 3:8 and a D 3:2. In this case,
when  ! 0, we have r ' 1:5. The average distribution of play in the two religions
is:
Ritual C D
C 88% 0%
D 0% 12%
Discipline C D
C 46% 12%
D 12% 30%
and we nd that average material utility is higher in the D religion. However, in
this case,  0 D 1 and  00 D a so that all individuals above  D 1 which represent
66%of the population would prefer R. Any voting rule or political process which will
give voice to such a supermajority will create some stickiness towards the less socially
efcient ritual-based religion. 
Remark 2. Our model abstracts away from comparisons related to specic religious
beliefs. One consideration when comparing across religions might be how individuals
forecast changes in their beliefs. The analysis above is suitable for the case in which
individuals believe that the relative strength of their religious beliefs, if society switches
between religions, will remain the same. That is, what is important is that their relative
ordering in society remains the same. This accords with the evolutionary biology idea
of a “religious mind” or a “religious gene”which is distributed in society and can adapt
to different religious systems.32
32. See Boyer (2002).
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5. Supply Side Considerations
In this section we discuss possible extensions of the model, focusing on the supply side
of religious organizations.
5.1. The Consistory and the Value of Information
We now provide more specic details about the Consistory and then extend the model
to consider comparative statics on the technology of public monitoring. Our discussion
below is based on Kingdom (1992), Dommen and Bratt (2007), McGrath (1990) and
Wilson (2002).
In 1541, upon his return to Geneva from exile in Strasbourg, Calvin had become
convinced of the need for a disciplined and well-ordered church. In his letter to the city
Council, Calvin writes: “If you desire to have me for your pastor correct the disorder
of your lives...I cannot possibly live in a place so grossly immoral...of what use is dead
faith without good works?? Re-establish there pure discipline”.33
Calvin drew up the structure of his well-ordered church in the Ecclesiastical
Ordinances (1541). The most distinctive and controversial aspect of this organization
was the Consistory. It was formed in 1542, “their office is to have oversight of the
life of everyone...there were to be twelve of them, chosen from the members of the
three councils, to keep an eye on everybody”.34 Thus, the consistory is designed to be
pro-active in monitoring and collecting information about behaviour, and moreover, it
should not restrict itself to monitor behaviour only in the religious sphere but in the
civic one as well.
The main objection to this body by the city council was because it feared that
the line between ecclesiastical and civil matters would be crossed. Indeed, a great
deal of its function was devoted to resolving disputes within families, neighbours,
and among business associates. Robert Kingdom who analyses the registrars of the
Consistory, writes: “A number of times businessmen were called in and questioned
about complicated deals involving loans of money..and those found guilty of usury were
subject to harsh penalties in an effort to form ethical business practice...At the end the
consistory was extremely successful in achieving discipline”. The Consistory’s normal
cases ended with either an admonition or a remonstrance, a kind of public scolding
delivered by one of the ministers, usually Calvin himself. Some of the cases ended
with excommunication, which denied access to one of the four annual communion
services in Geneva.
In Calvin’s attempt to spread his inuence into France, he supplied pastors that
were trained in Geneva, but insisted that local churches elect local Consistories. The
consistorial structure was made obligatory by the Venerable Company of Pastors in
1557; In 1562, the number of local consistories in France had risen to 1785. The fact
33. Cited in Beza (1996, rep.)
34. Ecclesiastical Ordinances (1541), in Gilbert (1998).
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that elders and deacons were to be provided locally indicates that the consistory had
an important role in monitoring, gathering and disseminating information, an activity
best done by locals. Thus, although Calvin was striving for strong control of the church
over individuals’ and pastors’ daily life, his most important institution was a local,
decentralized, one.
The discussion above illustrates that the decision to invest in a Consistory, or to
create a culture of monitoring, may be a concrete choice by religious leaders. To be
sure, such an investment may be costly, and the effectiveness of the Consistory may
also depend on other exogeneous conditions such as urbanization or literacy levels.
To look at the effect of public information let the parameter  2 Œ0; 1measure the
probability that rst period information is observed. Thus, with probability  the PD
game in period 2 proceeds with information about Period 1, whereas with probability
1    the game proceeds with no information which takes us back to the equilibrium
in the autarky benchmark of Lemma 1. The result below establishes that the higher is
 , the more signalling arises in the rst period (as the value of signalling is higher),
implying excessive signalling for sufciently high  . We also show how the individual
support for D is affected by :
Proposition 5. (i) For any the equilibrium is unique, and there exists a  0 such that
the equilibrium is characterized by excessive signalling for >  0 (with d1=d < 0/
and by accurate signalling for  <  0 (with d=d < 0, ./!0 ! O/; (ii) for
any  , there always exist a set of agents with weak beliefs who prefer the D religion
to R; (iii) when  is small enough, there exist parameters for which an increase in
 decreases the support for D; (iv) a strictly larger measure of agents prefer D to R
when  increases from being sufficiently small to being sufficiently large.
Note that all agents who defect in D always prefer a lower  as then more
miscoordination arises. Moreover, agents who defect both in D and in R would prefer
D to R for any  , as in R they do not benet at all from signalling while in D they
always face some miscoordination.
We also show that an increase in information does not necessarily increase the
support in the population for D, and in particular that when  is sufciently small,
an increase in  may imply that more agents actually prefer R. To see why, note
that when  ! 0, we have that  ! O . But a small increase in  implies that
the utility from D for all agents below  decreases; these agents always defect in
D and a higher  implies that accurate signalling arises more often (where others can
screen them out). If  is small enough and hence ./!0 sufciently large, a large
share of agents becomes worse off in D with more information. However, globally,
when  increases sufciently, the support for D increases. This arises as believers and
in particular those with strong enough beliefs will switch to prefer D once enough
cooperation and signalling levels are guaranteed.
The proposition indicates that religious beliefs alone may not be sufcient to
convince individuals to adopt the Calvinistic religion and that a sufcient level of
public monitoring needs to be provided for societies to switch to D. Note that Calvin
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was successful in Geneva only in his second spell in the city, when he initiated
the Consistory, which supports the above result. It is also interesting to note that in
Strasbourg, Zurich and Basel, the city councils did not give the church the power over
excommunication and no Consistory was created despite attempts of Reformers such
as Martin Bucer; the result above may also shed light on why these other attempts of
the Reformation which had similar theological systems, reduced the role of rituals, but
created no consistories, had initially failed.
5.2. The Choice of Rituals
We have looked above at the possibility of religious leaders designing the mechanism
of monitoring behaviour; naturally, how one models the cost of such a monitoring
institution will affect the choice of these leaders, while the benets, at least at the time
of the Reformation, could be captured by the degree of participation or the success of
shifting a society from a ritual-based to a discipline-based organization.
The choice of religious leaders in the ritual-based religion may be more
straightforward. Such leaders need to determine the level of rituals. They may
maximize participation, or revenues from the religion, if some of the cost of rituals can
be extracted as actual rent. We now show that in some environments, the equilibrium
with accurate signalling and largest participation will also be chosen by a religious
leader who maximises r. C .1   /.1   ..r/=a///, where .r/ is either  in an
accurate signalling equilibrium or 1 in an excessive signalling equilibrium:
Proposition 6. (i) In the set of excessive equilibria, the higher is 1 the higher are
the revenues from the ritual-based religion; (ii) in the set of accurate equilibria, when
 is low enough, the lower is  the higher are the revenues from the ritual-based
religion.
Together, (i) and (ii) imply that the cost of rituals characterized in Lemma 5 may
be chosen by religious leaders who maximize revenues. To see the intuition, consider
rst the set of accurate equilibria. When  is low enough, when r increases, it is
also the case that  decreases; a higher fee implies then that more types need to
change their behaviour. Thus decreasing  increases both the demand for rituals and
its price, which implies that the religious leader will choose the lowest possible , i.e.,
 D b   d . In the set of excessive signalling, even though whenever r increases the
demand for rituals also decreases, it is also the case that r has to be substantially lower
to attract the non-believers, and such elasticity implies that revenues are maximized
when r is highest in this set.
Remark 3. Note that we have assumed that ritual cost is equal for all. It is possible
to analyse a model and maintain the general results when the cost of rituals has an
individual component depending on  , as perhaps some individuals nd the rituals
intrinsically benecial. We have also assumed that the rituals are a deadweight loss
to society. Suppose instead that the ritual cost represents some monetary or charity
Journal of the European Economic Association
Preprint prepared on 10 February 2014 using jeea.cls v1.0.
Levy and Razin Rituals or Good Works 23
element that can be redistributed back to some of the members of the community, if
the church chooses to do so. This effectively will lower the cost of participation for the
members on the receiving end, taking us back to the case of heterogeneous cost which
can be analysed as discussed above.
5.3. Emphasis on Rituals or Discipline
So far, we have focused on the extreme cases of religious organizations that either
provide signalling by rituals or by monitoring of behaviour. Most religions will
probably use a mixture of both signals. In the appendix we formalise and analyse
equilibria in a model with such a hybrid religion; we show that the gist of our results
is maintained and thus it is sufcient to focus on the extreme cases.
We now discuss how different factors might imply that some religious
organisations will put more emphasis on particular types of signalling technologies.
First, the choice of the signalling mechanism might be related to the evolution of the
religious market. In a ritual-based religion, religious leaders may be able to extract
some rent or appropriate some portion of the cost of rituals. When they have monopoly
power, they might therefore prefer to stick to social coordination via rituals. In the
appendix we revisit Examples 1 and 2 and show that when hybrid religions exist, a
religion that fully focuses on rituals generates the highest revenues to the church.
It is also reasonable from the point of view of reformers to abolish rituals and
focus on discipline; one of the main explanations for the success of the Reformation
is the high costs of Catholic rituals (for example see Ekelund et al 2002). The process
of urbanization increased professionalism which implied that in terms of opportunity
costs, rituals as well as rent extraction by the church becamemore costly. The reformers
had to break away with old practices and specically those that were costliest to the
believers.
Second, geographical considerations and the constraints on information transmis-
sion may also affect the organisation of religious life. For example, subtle information
on past behaviour might be harder to exchange when considering trade between
villages, cities or countries, whereas rituals with physical attributes such as clothes,
language, and participation in sermons, may be more easily transmitted across distant
locations. With more dense population in cities, monitoring of discipline may become
easier. The urban population is alsomore literate and hencemaymake dissemination of
subtle information more viable. Finally, advancement in the technology of transmitting
information, such as the advent of printing, might affect the decision of religious
leaders to shift emphasis to a more discipline-based organisation.
Below we also discuss how the theology may be related to religious institutions
in general and the signalling mechanisms in particular; this implies that religions will
focus on some form of signalling which ts best their theology instead of choosing a
mixture.
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6. Discussion and Donclusion
Below we discuss the possible role of Theology in our model, as well as its link
to the social signalling mechanism. In addition, as a way of motivating our focus
on the Calvinistic Reformation, we discuss its differences compared with Luther’s
Reformation and provide some evidence of life in Geneva pre-Calvin in light of our
welfare results. We conclude by discussing similar phenomena in other religions,
and the comparative advantage of religion in sustaining cooperation vis a vis other
mechanisms.
6.1. Theologies and Institutions
To facilitate our analysis we have abstracted from differences in theologies and
assumed that both religions motivate good works in the same way. But different
theologies might affect individuals’ beliefs through different psychological channels
and might not be easily compared. For example, the self-signalling interpretation by
Weber (1904) of Calvinistic beliefs might induce incentives for good works but such a
mechanism is rather indirect. Also, Luther and Calvin encouraged their supporters to
go back to the scriptures and to read the Bible by themselves (enabled by the advent
of printing and higher levels of literacy), and this may lead to weaker or stronger
beliefs than when one participates in rituals conducted by priests, depending both on
the individuals and the priests in question. On the other hand, mechanisms such as
forgiveness and indulgences (the system of exchange between money and redemption)
that have evolved in the Catholic church might erode the connection between beliefs
and good works to some degree. It would be interesting to analyse these more nuanced
systems of beliefs.
We note though that the differences between these two theologies might be
consistent with the differences in the institutional structure (although the causality
between institutions and theology is not obvious). Specically, in the Catholic church,
good works alone do not sufce; according to Thomas Aquinas, three are required for
salvation: direct reliance on the church and its sacraments, the free turning of the will
to God and away from sin, and the remission of the guilt incurred by sin by priestly
absolution.35 In medieval times, this had evolved into a heavy load of public rituals
and an impressive system of rent extraction. More generally, this theology easily lands
itself to a hierarchical structure in which priests have to certify which actions provide
rewards and can possibly deliver forgiveness. In the absence of free will, such a role
of the Church’s hierarchy, which is reinforced by rituals, is reduced.
35. Thomas Aquinas, summa theologia. p.39.
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6.2. Calvin vs. Luther
We have focused on Calvin’s Reformation and not on Martin Luther’s. Luther differs
from Calvin both in terms of his theology and in terms of his general attitude towards
the relation between Church and morality.
In terms of theology, while Calvin advocates justication by the grace of God,
Luther focuses on justication by faith: “It is faith in Christ which makes him live in
me and move in me and act in me...faith receives Christ’s good works; love performs
good works for the neighbours” (cited in Green 1964). Luther offered individuals
personal certitude of salvation already in this life, provided only that they have faith.
These beliefs reduce the anxiety about salvation and as a result, good works become
less important (McGrath 1990).
More generally, Luther permitted religion to be identied with neither ethics nor
social justice as religion transcended both. An interesting illustration of this is Luther’s
response to the Peasants’ Revolt in 1525: Luther rmly resisted the slightest diminution
of religion and criticized the peasants’ characterization of their demands for social
justice as being Christian demands (Ozment 1980).
In terms of the institutional structure of the Church, Luther has created no
institutions, let alone the Consistory, and discipline was not considered an issue for
the Church. In 1530, in the Confession of Augsburg, Luterhans insisted that there are
only two marks of a true church: the church is the assembly of saints in which the
gospel is taught purely and the sacraments are administered rightly. In particular, there
is no requirement of good behaviour, which Calvinists considered as the third mark of
a good Church.36
6.3. Geneva before Calvin
Our analysis indicates that the discipline-based religion is more likely to be adopted
when monitoring and information dissemination institutions arise (see Proposition 5).
We have argued above that this could explain why Calvin was only successful in
his second tenure in Geneva, when he created the Consistory. Also, urbanization and
increased literacy levels which is correlated with urban professionalism, have both
enabled the dissemination of more subtle information and have made Calvinism more
attractive in line with our results.
Propositions 3 and 4 indicate that discipline-based religions are more likely to be
successful when strategic complementarities are large enough and when cooperation
is more important than coordination. While an empirical analysis that tackles this
question is beyond the scope of our analysis, it is clear that cooperation was much
in demand in Geneva in the pre-Calvin times. McGarth (1990) describes the city as
36. It is also worth mentioning that similar arguments formed the debate in England between Calvinist
Puritans and Erastian Anglicans and that the debate on this goes on even today. In the formula adopted by
the churches of the Reformation in US in 1997 it was decided that there should be no mention of the mark
of discipline.
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being in decay, exhibiting reduced morality, and in need in some reformation, not only
religious but social, political and economic. Wilson (2002) writes more specically:
“By Calvin’s own account, his primary challenge was to unite the fractious city of
Geneva in to an effective corporate unit...Geneva also had an infrastructure and
the burden of supporting it was probably greater for the average citizen than now...a
massive wall around the city had to be maintained, the swiss mercenaries that protected
Geneva from the duchy of savoy had to be paid, a plague hospital had to be build,
charity had to be given to the poor, an educational system had to be built, the list
of public goods goes on and on. The temptation to avoid the burden must have been
great, not to speak of subverting the entire system.”
6.4. Other Religions
In this section we bring forward a few examples of religious organisations which share
similar attributes to that of Calvin’s institutional structure.
The Orthodox Church and the Old Believers
With some similarity to the Reformation, in 1666 the Old Believers separated from
the Orthodox church after the reforms of Patriarch Nikon which introduced a number
of ritual and textual revisions with the aim of achieving uniformity between Russian
and Greek Orthodox practices. The Old believers have been compared to Calvin’s
reformation in Geneva and to its successors the Quakers andBaptist sects, both in terms
organisation and economic achievements.37 Several papers analyse their contribution
to the rise of private industrial enterprise in early nineteenth-century Russia and in
particular their role in the success of the Moscow textile industry (see Blackwell
1965 and Raskov 2012). Old believer communities still exist today. The following
is an example of the public scrutiny of behaviour in a community of Old Believers
in Oregon, USA:38 “In recent years, the nastayatyel has been increasingly called on
to administer punishments and other forms of discipline to miscreant young people.
These punishments usually consist of a public announcement of the individual’s sins
to the congregation at the end of the service, whereupon the transgressors may be
compelled to perform several prostrations before the congregation, or some other act
of contrition and penance”.
Ismailies
Around the 17th century, the Ismailis (a branch of the Shia Islam) have created social
structures similar to Calvinist sects. Specically, two institutions were created: the
Jamat, an assembly in the council of all the adult males, and the Jamat Khana, a council
37. See Levintova (2007) and Vorontsova and Filatov (2000) for example.
38. see http://pages.uoregon.edu/sshoemak/325/texts/old_believers.htm
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hall or guildhall of the community. There is a large literature in Sociology comparing
these institutions and the Ismaili sect to Calvinist ones. Clarke (1976) describes the
practice of these institutions in Britain asmixing the secular and the religious: “The role
of the Jamat is multiple..it is well nigh impossible for an ismaili to make a meaningful
distinction between the religious and the social. The jamat is regarded as a community
centre which serves as a variety of purposes..a conciliar system of organization and
administration is now operative which is similar to that of Calvinism...”.
Similarly, Bocock (1971), analysing the large Ismaili community in Tansania,
describes features as in Calvinism such as the abundance of local leaders, and the
role of the religion in monitoring secular affairs: “Unlike the pope, the Imam is not
surrounded by a large structure with full time priests and bishops staffing it, but can
choose local leaders himself...A local community of ismailies govern their own secular
affairs and meet for worship every day..this is similar to some of the organizational
forms among calvinists, or calvinist influenced groups such as congregationalists,
quakers, baptists”.
Finally, Goldthorpe (1996) stresses the discipline element: “Both [calvinist and
ismaili] religions were notably congregational in their form of organization, and
the local community of Ismailis who met daily in the Jamat Khan, the Ismaili mosque,
constituted also a community exercising moral control over its members, and providing
them - when in good standing - with mutual aid and credit networks”.
6.5. Other Institutions Supporting Cooperation
We have advocated a view of religious organizations as enabling cooperation through
a system of beliefs which induce preferences for cooperation, and an organizational
structure that allows for the signalling of these preferences. There is a vast literature
in Economics analysing how cooperation can arise in situations such as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma and our analysis is complementary to this literature.
One large literature concerns how cooperation might arise when groups are
involved in repeated interactions. The scope for cooperation in these environments
is constrained by discounting of future pay-offs and by the size of the community. In
addition, Greif (1989) shows that even within the repeated game literature religious
organizations have a role; specically, they allow to create coalitions which are not
too large and which are conducive to both information transmission and enforcement
of punishments. Our results are complementary to these. We focus instead on
environments in which cooperation per se is less of an issue, as some individuals are
motivated to cooperate by their religious beliefs, and show how religious organisations
use this starting point to induce higher levels of cooperation.
A second type of literature assumes that agents have preferences for cooperation
(e.g., Tabellini 2008) and analyses the conditions for their evolution. Greif and
Tabellini (2010) focus on the evolution of cooperation towards kin vs indiscriminate
cooperation. In their dichotomy, clans have strongmorality and rely on repeated games
while cities have looser morality but rely on institutions. Our analysis is related to this
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as we also combine preferences for cooperation in an institutional set up, albeit both
preferences and institutions are provided by the religion.
Finally, it may be argued that when state capacity is developed, institutions
and legal courts are sufcient to promote cooperation as they allow enforcement of
contracts. This might imply that these institutions will crowd out religion in its role
of facilitating cooperation. The literature on contract theory has however also noted
that there are intrinsic problems in enforceability of contracts even in the presence
of symmetric information; e.g., imperfect veriability or the inability to describe
complicated scenarios. Equilibrium behaviour as in our model is naturally immune
to such problems.39
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
As agents can cooperate or defect without any other conditions, the equilibrium must
be a cutoff equilibrium as described in the Lemma. To show that such an equilibrium
exists, note that if we set O D a then the LHS is positive for any  > 0, while if we set
O D 0, then the LHS is negative, and thus there will be a cutoff O . Moreover, the LHS
is monotone in O which will imply uniqueness.
Proof of Lemma 2
Bymonotonicity of beliefs, if a cutoff type signals at  , all abovewith  0 >  will wish
to signal as well, at least weakly. This implies that the only monotone equilibria are as
described in the Lemma. To see that (1) has a unique solution, note that it implies,
2 D a
.b   d   1/C a

1 
.b d/
a
.b   d   1/C a

1 
:
As @.2/=@ < 0, then lim!1 2 D b   d < 2 < a D lim!0 2.
Proof of Lemma 3
We will now consider existence and uniqueness for the excessive signalling
equilibrium in D. The xed point equation for 1 is:
(*) ..1  /
.a   1/
a
C /.d  b/C .1  /
1
a
. a/C1C ..1  /
.a   2/
a
/.b a/D 0
39. It is also worthwhile to mention that the theories of the role of religion as enabling signalling and
hence cooperation, by both Adam Smith and Max Weber, were written at times and places in which state
capacity was already sufciently developed.
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where 2 is given by
(**) 2 D a
.b   d   1/C a

1 
.b d/
a
.b   d   1/C a

1 
Note that from the above 2 is monotonically decreasing in 1.
Suppose that 1 D 0. Then
2j1D0 D a
.b   d/C a 
1 
.b d/
a
.b   d/C a 
1 
If ..1  /aC /.d   b/C ..1  /.a  2.0//C /.b a/ 0 then there exists an
equilibriumwith 1D 0. If ..1  /aC /.d  b/C ..1  /.a 2.0//C /.b a/ <
0 then there exists an equilibriumwith 0 < 1  b   d . To see this, note that at 1 D 0,
the LHS of (*) is negative. On the other hand at 1 D b   d from (*) and (**) we have
2j1Db d D b   d
and the LHS of (*) becomes,
..1  /
.a   1/
a
C /.d   b/C .1  /
1
a
. a/C 1 C ..1  /
.a   2/
a
C /.b   a/
D ..1  /
.a   b C d/
a
C /.d   b/  .1  /.b   d/C .b   d/
C ..1  /
.a   bC d/
a
C /.b   a/
D
1
a
.1  /..a   b C d/.d   a/C .b   a/ > 0
So a value of 1 satisfying (*) exists and is the solution to the two equations. To
see the uniqueness of a solution note that using (*) and (**) we get,
..1  /
.a   1/
a
C /.d  b/C .1  /
1
a
. a/C1C ..1  /
.a   2.1//
a
C /.b a/D 0
Note that this expression is monotone in 1,
@LHS
@1
D .1  /.b   d/C    .1  /.b   a/
@2.1/
@1
> 0;
which insures uniqueness.We now show that there is no accurate equilibrium. The
xed point equation for  is:
(***) ..1  /
.a   /
a
C /.d   b/C .1  /

a
. a/C C ...1  /
.a   /
a
C /d
C.1  /

a
aC ..1  /
.a   /
a
C //  .b C .1  /a/ D 0
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At  D b   d the LHS becomes,
.1  /.a   b C d/.
d
a
  1/ > 0
At  D a the LHS becomes,
2.d   b C a/ > 0
Therefore if the derivative with respect to  is monotone we will not have such
an equilibrium; the derivative of the lhs of (***) after some manipulation is,
 .1  /

2d   b C 2   a
a

C 1C 
Note that this expression is decreasing in . Therefore it is either rst positive and
then negative or always negative. In either case an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Lemma 4
The equations for the equilibrium cost of rituals are provided in the text from which it
is clear to see that for any ; a ritual cost can support this  as a signalling cutoff in the
rst period.40
Proof of Lemma 5
Consider an equilibrium with excessive signalling which is characterized by,
r D 2.1  /
a   2
a

.b   a/
Note that higher levels of rituals must give rise to a lower 2 and as a result a higher
1, and thus serve to improve the content of the signal.
Let us compare this equilibrium to one in which r D 2.1  /.1  .b d/=a/.b 
a/, i.e., an accurate equilibrium with  D b   d . Remember that r > r . Note that
all those that did not pay r , or that defect (are below 2), are indifferent among these
r 0s as their net utility when they either pay or not pay for rituals is b C .1  /a per
period. On the other hand, all agents above 2, have a higher utility when r increases
to r. To see why, note that 2 decreases to 
, and thus they receive, for the interval of
change Œ; 2; a relative benet of .1  /.d   .2   .b   d///=a > 0 per period in
the equilibrium with r, where .1  /.d=a/ represent the difference in material pay-
off from the PD game whereas .1  /.2   .b   d//=a represents the increase in the
payment from r to r (per period). Finally, these types have another increase in their
40. Note that when r is small enough, it is possible to support an equilibria in which all participate in
rituals (i.e., 1 D 0). This equilibrium relies on out of equilibrium beliefs that all in .2; a/ will defect
against the one who does not participate in rituals.
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utility as when 1 increases, they defect against more agents who defect against them
which provides them a higher utility according to their beliefs. Therefore, all excessive
signalling equilibria are Pareto dominated by the equilibrium with r.
Now let us now look at r which sustains accurate signalling, i.e.,  0 2 .b   d; a/.
Those who do not pay r gain the same utility b C .1  /a per period, whereas types
 > 1 who pay r , get 2. C .1   /.a   
0/=a/d C .1   / 0 C . C .1   /.a  
 0/=a/   r , for
r D 2..d   b C  0/C .1  /

a    0
a

.d   aC  0//
The utility of agents above  0 as a function of  is
d C .1  /
a    0
a
d C .1  /
 0
a
a
C

 C .1  /
a    0
a

   .d   b C  0/  .1  /

a    0
a

.d   aC  0/
per period. The derivative w.r.t  0 for some type  is
.1  /

1 
d C 
a

   C .1  /

d   aC  0
a

  .1  /

a    0
a

< 0,
.1  /

2 0   
a

  1 < 0
which is satised as  0 <  < a. Therefore, all these types prefer a religionwith a lower
cutoff and again any such equilibriumwill be Pareto dominated by the equilibriumwith
r.
Proof of Proposition 1
We start with the following helpful Lemma.
Lemma A.1. (i) There is more mutual cooperation in R if and only if 
2
a
  1

  
2  2
a
  1

 
1

  1
a
/.2  1
a
  1

 > 1;
(ii) if
1 C 2
2a
>
1

then there is more total coordination in the R religion.
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Proof of Lemma A1
(i) Mutual cooperation in theR religion is 2.1  1=/2 where it is .1  1=a/
2C .1 
2=a/
2 in theD religion. 
1 
1

2
>
 
1  1
a
2
C
 
1  2
a
2
2
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 
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2
a
  1

  
2  2
a
  1

 
1

  1
a
  
2  1
a
  1

 > 1:
(ii) Total miscoordination in the R religion is given by 2= . In the D religion
miscoordination is larger than .1 C 2/=a.
We now prove the proposition. In particular we prove that the statement is true
when  is small enough, uniformly for the parameters of the model. We therefore
consider a convergent sequence of parameters ¹an; bn; dnº
1
nD1 and a sequence
¹mº
1
mD1 such that limm!1 m D 0. Let n D an=.bn   dn/. By Lemma 2, for any
m and n, there is a unique equilibrium, .
n;m
1 ; 
n;m
2 /. Equilibrium equations are,

.1  m/

1 

n;m
1
an

C m

.dn   bn/
C m
n;m
1 C ..1  m/

1 
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2
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
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
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n;m
1
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
C m
1 m
1 

n;m
1
.bn dn/

C n
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1 m
D
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There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. Suppose that n !n!11. The second equilibrium equation can be written
as, 
n;m
2
an
  1
n


1
n
 

n;m
1
an
 D .n   1/
1 

n;m
1
.bn dn/

C n
m
1 m
Taking the double limit, rst with respect to n and then with respect to m, we get,
lim
m!1
lim
n!1


n;m
2
an
  1
n


1
n
 

n;m
1
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 D lim
m!1
lim
n!1
.n   1/
1 

n;m
1
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
C n
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1  m
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This implies that (
n;m
2 C 
n;m
1 /=2an > 1=n for a low enough .
Note also that, 
2 
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2
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  1
n


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2
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  1
n
 > 1  1N
2
> 0:
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This implies that for any  > 1 there exists a  > 0 such that for any  >  and
 < ,  
2
a
  1

  
2  2
a
  1

 
1

  1
a
  
2  1
a
  1

 > 1
and so there is more mutual cooperation in the R religion.
Case 2. Suppose that n !n!1   . First note that as a; b and d are bounded
and as a > a there exists a  > 0 such that (bn   an/=.bn   dn/ < .
Case 2(i): Suppose that, .1  
n;m
1 =.bn   dn//!n!1 0. In this case we get,

n;m
2
an
  1
n


1
n
 

n;m
1
an
 !n!1 .n   1/
n
m
1 m
But this means that
lim
m!1
lim
n!1


n;m
2
an
  1
n


1
n
 
n;m
1
an
 D1
and as before (
n;m
2 C 
n;m
1 /=2an > 1=n for a low enough  as well as
2 
n;m
2
an
  1
n


2 

n;m
2
an
  1
n
 > 1  1N
2
> 0
so that we have that
lim
m!1
lim
n!1


n;m
2
an
  1
n


1
n
 
n;m
1
an


2 

n;m
2
an
  1
n


2 
n;m
2
an
  1
n
 D1
This implies that for any  <  there exists a 
0
> 0 such that for any  < 
0
, 
2
a
  1

  
2  2
a
  1

 
1

  1
a
/.2  1
a
  1

 > 1
and so there is more mutual cooperation in the R religion.
Case 2(ii): Suppose that .1   
n;m
1 =.bn   dn// !n!1  > 0. Using the second
equation we get,

n;m
2
an
D

1 

n;m
1
.bn dn/

C m
1 m
1 

n;m
1
.bn dn/

C n
m
1 m
!n!1
C m
1 m
C  m
1 m
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But looking at the rst equation as n!1:
 ..1  m/

 C   1


C m/C m.1  /C m
 
   1
C  m
1 m
!
.bn   an/
.bn   dn/
D 0
(A.1)
Where we have substituted the following equations,
lim
n!1

1 

n;m
1
an

D lim
n!1

1 

n;m
1
.bn   dn/n

D

 C   1


lim
n!1


n;m
1
.bn   dn/

D 1  
lim
n!1

1 

n;m
2
an

D

m
1  m
 
   1
C  m
1 m
!
But note that in (A.1) for high enoughm this equation cannot hold as it is negative.
Therefore this case cannot arise for large enoughm.
To conclude the proof of this part we choose N < min¹0; º.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that n !n!1 1. By the second equilibrium equation, we have that
lim
n!1

n;m
2
an
D lim
n!1

1 

n;m
1
.bn dn/

C m
1 m
1 
n;m
1
.bn dn/

C n
m
1 m
D 0:
As n !n!1 1 and 
n;m
1 < .bn   dn/ (by Lemma 1) we have that
lim
n!1

n;m
1
an
D 0
Thus, in both religions, for high enough n, cooperation is almost full. However,
rn;m D 2..1  m/.1  .bn dn/=an/.bn an// > 0when (b d/=a¹ 1. Therefore,
either the D religion is strictly preferred, for high enough n, or they converge to yield
the same average welfare.
Proof of Proposition 3
In R, material welfare of all types below b   d is b C .1  /a per period, whereas
the material welfare of all types above b   d per period is d C .1   /.1   .b  
d/=a/.d   b C a/C .1   /.b   d/ . a by strategic complementarities, for a small
enough . On the other hand, in D, social welfare for all is some combination of a, b=2
and d . Thus if a is not sufciently larger than b=2, D dominates.
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Proofs of Lemma 5 and Proposition 4
Let 
Œi ;j 
RD denote the difference in expected utility of types in the interval Œi ; j 
from R vs. D. We consider below average utility per period of play i.e. in R the utility
in the one-period PD game minus r=2, and in D average utility across the two periods.
Consider rst all types in Œ2; a.

Œ2;a
RD D .d C /C .1  /.1  .b   d/=a/.d   b C aC /C .1  /.b   d/
 
1
2
Œ. C .1  /.1  1=a//d C  C . C .1  /.1  2=a//d
C. C .1  /.1  1=a// C 2.1  /1
D .1  /.1  .b   d/=a/.d   b C a/C .1  /.b   d   1/
 
"
..1  /.1 
1C2
2
a
//dC Œ.1  /.1=2a   .b   d/=a/
#
:
Hence 
Œ2;a
RD is decreasing in  in this region. This is true as 1 < b   d .
Consider now types in .0; 1/.

.0;1/
RD D b
C .1  /a  
1
2
Œ. C .1  /.1  1=a/bC .1  /1C b C .1  //a < 0
for all .
Consider types in .1; b   d/ W they have the same utility in R as the types below
but a higher utility in D from their own point of view. Hence
Œ1;b d
RD must be lower
and decreasing. Specically,

Œ1;b d
RD D b C .1  /a
 
1
2
Œ. C .1  /.1  1=a//d C  C . C .1  /.1  2=a//bC .1  /2 < 0
for all .
Consider now types in .b   d; 2/.
Note that type b   d is indifferent between paying for the ritual or not and hence
is utility from R is b C .1  /a. For all types above b   d , the utility from R will be
bC .1  /aC .   .b   d//.C .1  /.1  .b   d/=a//, as their type affects their
spiritual utility in the order of the probability by which they are cooperating. Their
utility from D differs only in the spiritual payoff that accrue in the rst period with
probability one. Thus we have,

Œb d;2
RD
D 
Œb d;2
RD jDb d C .   .b   d//.
1
2
 C .1  /.a   2.b   d//=2a//:
This may be increasing or decreasing, depending on the sign of 1
2
 C .1  /.a  
2.b   d//=2a. If it is decreasing, then the highest RD is for the type at 0 and it
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is negative. So, if  <  0./ !!0 2, then all prefer R, which proves (i). If it is
increasing, so  >  0./, then the highestRD , if positive, is for the type at 2. Thus
two cutoffs  0 > b   d and  00 2 Œ 0; a arise so that all supporters of R are in Œ 0;  00,
with 2 2 Œ
0;  00.
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) We rst analyze equilibrium existence for all  . For the excessive signalling
equilibrium,
(*) ..1  /
.a   1/
a
C /.d  b/C .1  /
1
a
. a/C1C..1  /
.a   2/
a
/.b a/D 0
We can repeat the analysis in Lemma 3 to show that for a  large enough, such an
equilibrium would still hold. Note that the higher is  , the higher are the gains from
signalling which implies that 1 must decrease and admits the lowest value for  D 1.
For small enough  , we might now have a negative lhs for all 1  b   d ; thus
due to the monotonicity of the lhs in 1, the equilibriummust have accurate signalling.
The equilibrium condition for the accurate signalling equilibrium is:
..1  /
.a   /
a
C /.d   b/C .1  /

a
. a/C  C ....1  /
.a   /
a
C /d
C.1  /

a
aC ..1  /
.a   /
a
C //  .b C .1  /a// D 0:
For a small enough  this now can be an equilibrium and in particular in the limit
when  ! 0, we have that  ! O .
Due to the linearity in  , it is easy to see that there exists 0 such that for all  >  0
there exists an equilibriumwith excessive signalling, andmoreover that  01./ < 0. For
 <  0 there exists an equilibrium with accurate signalling, again with 0./ < 0.
(ii) In the accurate equilibrium, all agents below b   d must prefer D always to R,
as in R they get a while in D they get some b in the rst period. This is the same in the
excessive signalling equilibrium for all agents below 1. This establishes (ii).
(iii) Explained in the text.
(iv) We will now show that globaly, all agents prefer a high enough  to a low
enough  . We will show this result for extreme  0s, specically  D 0 and  D 1. By
continuity and given (i), this holds for high enough and low enough  0s.
As the utility under  D 0 for individuals below b   d is . C .1   /.1  
O=a//b C .1  / O per period whereas in R their utility is b C .1  /a per period,
they prefer D for all . On the other hand, for a small enough , individuals above
b   d , have a utility which converges to a per period under  D 0 and a utility which
is strictly higher than a per period in R (they can always guarantee a if they defect and
thus in any equilibrium their material and spiritual utility must be greater than a/. More
specically, consider individuals in  2 Œb   d; O. Their utility difference between
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rituals and  D 0 is increasing in  and is the lowest for the type at b   d (as he is
gaining the least from spiritual payoff) for which, per period, it is . O=a  1/.b a/ < 0.
Thus, there must be a cutoff in Œb   d; O, above which, for small  (as then O ! a/,
all types prefer R and below which they prefer  D 0. For all  though, this cutoff is
strictly above b   d .
It is easy to show that all types at least weakly prefer  D 1 to  D 0 in D. Thus,
weakly, the set of supporters must increase. We now show that indeed there are types
that switch their preferences. Consider the type at b   d and his difference in utility
between R and  D 1. From the proof of Proposition 4 we know that this type strictly
prefers  D 1 for all . On the other hand, when  is small enough, the utility of
this type from  D 0 approaches his utility from R. By continuity, there exist a type
 > b   d but close enough that switches to prefer D when  increases.
Proposition 6
(i) For all equilibria with excessive signalling,
r D 2.1 
2
a
/.1  /.b   a/
Note that dr D  d2.2.b   a/.1   //=a. To maximize r. C .1   /.1   1=a//,
the f.o.c is dr.C .1  /.1  1=a//  d1r.1  /=a D  d22.b   a/.1  /=a  
d1r.1  /=a. We therefore care about the sign of  d22.b   a/  d1r .
But according to (1), 2 D .a.b   d   1/C a=.1  //.b   d//=.b   d   1C
a=.1   //, and then we have d2 D d1a.b   d   a/=.1   /..b   d   1/C
a=.1  //2. Thuswe need to check the sign ofa=.b d   1C a=.1  //  .1  /
but .a  .1  /.b   d   1/  a/=.b  d   1C a=.1  // > 0 iff b   d   1 > 0
which is indeed the case and hence this expression is positive. We therefore have
revenues increasing in 1.
(ii) Now consider accurate equilibria, where the expression for the ritual cost is
r D 2..d   b C / C .1   /.a   /.d   a C /=a/. The revenues again are
r.C .1  /.a  /=a/ and the foc is dr.C .1  /.a  /=a/  dr.1  /=a.
We then have dr D d2. C .1  /. d C 2a   2/=a/ so we need to check the
sign of . C .1   /. d C 2a   2/=a/. C .1   /.a   /=a/2   2..d   b C
/C .1  /.a  =a/.d   aC //.1  /=a, which for a small  is . d C 2a  
2/.a   /=a2   .a   /.d   a C //=a2. We then need to check the sign of
 d C 2a  2 d C a   D 3a  2d   3. Note that for this to be negative for all
 we need to check at  D b   d . We then have 3a  2d   3bC 3d D 3aC d   3b
which is negative when  is not too large.
Appendix B: A Hybrid Religion
We now consider the game assuming that both rituals and information about behaviour
in the rst PD game are fully available. It will be simpler andmore sensible to consider
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a slight change in timing, where the game would be as follows: in Period 0 agents are
randomly matched to play the PD game. In Period 1 they can pay r , and in Period 2
they are matched again to play the PD game now with possibly two signals available
about their opponent.41 As usual, we are considering monotone equilibria, so that (i)
those who do not signal at all defect for sure in any remaining PD game(s); (ii) those
that pay r are a connected interval and those that cooperate are a connected interval
and one of these intervals is nested in the other. Thus society in equilibrium is divided
into Œ0; 1; Œ1; 2; Œ2; a, where Œ2; a uses both signals, Œ1; 2 uses one signal and
Œ0; 1 does not signal.
We now consider the behaviour in Period 2 following the signalling behaviour.
Note that it cannot be that all in Œ1; 2 defect against Œ2; a as then by monotonicity
they would also defect against each other. But also Œ2; a must defect against them;
hence no one changes their action in response to the signal used by Œ1; 2 which
implies that their signalling is a waste, a contradiction. Also it cannot be that all agents
in Œ1; 2 fully cooperate against Œ2; a as then again by monotonicity all agents in
Œ2; a will cooperate against its own which implies that their signalling is a waste, a
contradiction. However, it must be that all agents in Œ2; a fully cooperate against each
other. If not, then it must be that 2 < b   d which implies that all agents in Œ1; 2
will defect against agents in Œ2; a which we showed above cannot be.
Given the above, it must be that: (i) Œ0; 1 defect against all; (ii) Œ1; 2 partially
cooperates with Œ2; a and at least partially defecting against itself; (iii) Œ2; a fully
cooperates against itself and at least partially cooperates against Œ1; 2. The simplest
form of equilibrium will include agents in Œ1; 2 defecting against each other and
agents in Œ2; a fully cooperating against Œ1; 2. Finally let us set the type at 2
indifferent between cooperating or not.42 Let 3 2 Œ1; 2 be the lowest type that
cooperates against Œ2; a. Note that it must be that 3 D b   d .
We now analyze the two possible cases: either the group at Œ1; 2 cooperates at
period 0, or the group at Œ1; 2 pays r in period 1.
Case 1. types in Œ1; 2 signal by cooperation in Period 0:
The equilibrium conditions are:
. C .1  /.a 1
a
//.d   b/C .1  /1
a
. a/C 1C .1  /.
a 2
a
/.b   a/ D 0
.2   3/C a

1 
.2   1/C a

1 
.d   b/C
.3   1/
.2   1/C a

1 
. a/C 2 D 0
.1  /

.2   3/
a
d C .2   a/
.2   1/
a

D r
41. This is simpler as otherwise the game in Period 1 will be both a signalling period and a period in
which individuals respond to the previous signal r . This timing also captures more the essence of how to
accomodate two signals.
42. If other types of equilibria exist they will admit a similar structure.
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For this case it is easy to show the following:
(i) For some parameters, as in Example 1, the revenues of the church are higher in
the R religion than in the hybrid religion.
To create a fair comparison, we consider r in the R religion that applies for one
signalling period, as here. We then have to show that:
.2   3/
a
d C .2   a/
.2   1/
a

a   2
a
<
a   3
a
.b   a/
a   3
a
Note that if for example b > aC 0:5d (as in example 1) the above holds.
(ii) This equilibrium does not exist in Example 2.
Case 2. types in Œ1; 2 signal by paying r in Period 0:
In this case the equilibrium equations are:
. C .1  /.a 2
a
//.d   b/C .1  /2
a
. a/C 2
C.1  /

.2   3/
a
d C .2   a/
.2   1/
a

D 0
.2   3/C a

1 
.2   1/C a

1 
.d   b/C
.3   1/
.2   1/C a

1 
. a/C 2 D 0
.1  /.a 2
a
/.b   a/ D r
Again, as above, we can show:
(ii) In Example 1, the revenues of the church are higher in the R religion than in
the hybrid religion.
(iii) This equilibrium does not exist in Example 2.
(iii) If we are limited to have r  r

2
(where r is the level of r in the Pareto efcient
equilibrium) then this equilibrium cannot arise (to see why note that here 2 > b   d
and hence it must be that r < r/.
As a nal comment note that the gist of our results is maintained. Specically, the
second type of equilibrium often does not hold, which implies that paying r is much
more likely to be an accurate signal whereas signalling by discipline is more likely to
be an inaccurate signal. When comparing the hybrid religion to the “pure” religions
it is the case that the R religion provides more coordination, whereas the D religion
saves on cost, as in our main analysis.
Appendix C: “Belief Activation” Refinement
Ritual-Based Religion. Suppose that individuals are not endowed with religious
beliefs, but that they gain such beliefs only if they participate in rituals, i.e., pay the
cost r . More specically, individuals have “latent” types in Œ0; a and this type will be
activated when they pay r but not activated otherwise. Many religious organizations
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play an active role in shaping beliefs and invest time and effort in advocating certain
kinds of messages while censoring others. This assumption is therefore reasonable
when considering religious organizations and it specically ts the Catholic religion
where the rewards from good works were also conditioned on participation in rituals.
The role of rituals in such an alternative model is therefore two-fold: to endow
individuals with beliefs favouring cooperation and to serve as a public signal.
Since this model involves a choice of beliefs, we need to add to the equilibrium
concept a stability condition. Namely, an individual of type  who in equilibrium
had paid r and has activated her beliefs, will, given her current beliefs  and other
equilibrium behaviour, prefer to do so than not pay r and defect against all. Similarly
an individual who had not paid r and had not activated her beliefs, prefers to do so than
to acquire beliefs and sometimes cooperate, given her current beliefs (e.g.,  D 0/ and
equilibrium behaviour of others. For more on this stability notion and the robustness
of the results to other stability notions, see Levy and Razin (2012).
The assumption on belief activation implies that whoever does not participate in
rituals, has no beliefs in favour of cooperation, and will therefore defect. Together
with the stability notion above, it implies that as in our model, equilibria can only be
as described in Lemma 2 with exactly the same equilibrium conditions specied in the
text, and that such equilibria indeed exist.
Discipline-Based Religion. As above, suppose that individuals have “latent” types in
Œ0; a and that they have to choose to activate these beliefs prior to the two period PD
game. As both Calvin and Luther called for believers to return back to the scriptures
and read the bible themselves, suppose that it is costless and private to activate beliefs,
and as a tie-breaking rule, that if individuals forecast that their utility from activating
beliefs and not activating beliefs is the same, then they do not activate their beliefs.
Again, the equilibrium will demand that individuals who did not activate their beliefs,
given all other equilibrium behaviour, will be happy with this decision and vice verse.
With this assumption one can show that there will be no individual who defects
in the rst period and cooperates later on. Thus only monotone equilibria can arise as
described in Lemma 2.Moreover, these equilibria indeed exist in this alternativemodel
as it is optimal for all those who defect not to acquire beliefs (and hence defect from
that point onwards).
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